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DIScovERY BEFORE TRIAL. By George Ragland, Jr. Chicago: Callaghan
and Company. 1932. pp. x, 406.
IN a forward to this volume Professor Edson R. Sunderland, who can surely
speak with authority, says: "It is probable that no procedural process offers
greater opportunities for increasing the efficiency of the administration of
justice than that of discovery before trial. Much of the delay in the prepara-
tion of'a case, most of the lost effort in the course of the trial, and a large
part of the uncertainty in the outcome, result from the want of information
on the part of litigants and their counsel as to the real nature of the respectivo
claims and the facts upon which they rest." 1
Here we have in a workmanlike treatise a complete account of this pro-
cedural device, which can provide what the formal pleadings were supposed to
but did not supply, namely, trustworthy information of the facts complained
of by each side. The author, now a member of the Chicago bar, was formerly
research associate in the Legal Research Institute of the University of Michigan
Law School, and in the course of a two-year investigation visited many
jurisdictions to observe the actual operation of this process. He thus is able
to set out a thorough examination of the conflicting theories as to the scope and
method of discovery, its practical use in various proceedings and against various
parties and, finally, a complete summary of the statutory provisions on the
subject in the several states, and in England, Ontario, and Quebec.
According to the ancient chancery rule, discovery was permitted only an
to matter supporting the mover's own case. It was available merely for
defense and not for attack. Under modern practice, still resisted in many
places, it should be freely available to ascertain not only the facts of the
mover's own case but also those supporting the case of his adversary. The
bugaboo that this might stimulate perjury to meet the case thus disclosed is
yielding, however, to recognition of the fact that justice will not suffer but
may be expedited if each party knows fully beforehand his adversary's testimony.
Again the ancient practice limited the method of discovery to the use of written
interrogatories, a practice far inferior to the oral examination. Some curoug
results of attempts at reform have been occasioned by advance in one aspect
and not in the other. Thus Massachusetts has undertaken to broaden the
scope of discovery while retaining the interrogatory method, while Now York
has retained the narrow chancery limits as to the scope of the remedy but has
introduced the new method of oral examination to the confusion of the practice.
Perhaps the most effective use of discovery occurs when it is supplemented
by another modern procedural device-the summary judgment. If discovery
is available to ascertain what the facts of the case are, and summary judgment
is available for quick disposition of the case after the facts are known, speed
and efficiency in litigation result without sacrifice of substantial justice in those
cases where the facts indicate a real defense. This the author has well ex-
plained in a special chapter on this combination of methods. We are indeed
1. See Professor Sunderland's article in this issue of the Yale Law Journal,
Scope and Method of Discovery before Trial (1933) 42 YALE L. J.
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indebted to him for a most satisfactory type of law book, one 'which aims at
a single objective, and reaches it with sureness and completeness.
The text seems to have been prepared before it was possible to include the
amendment to the Connecticut statute and the new rules thereunder adopted by
the Superior Court judges in 1931. These followed the recommenaations of
the Connecticut Judicial Council in its Second Report (1930), and have been
analyzed elsewhere by Professor Sunderland.2 Connecticut lawyers may, and
perhaps should, be shocked to learn that even after these changes so extensive
in form, we have but the restricted type of discovery, limited in scope and
available only by the outworn method of written interrogatories.
Yale School of -Law. CHARIM E. CLARI.
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY. By Adolph A. Berle,
Jr. and Gardiner C. Means. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
1932. pp. xiii, 396. $4.50.
Reviewed by Jerome Fra -dt
Tnis book will perhaps rank with Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations as the
first detailed description in admirably clear terms of the existence of a new
economic epoch. For what, in effect, the authors tell us is this: Without our
knowing it, we have been passing through a revolution comparable to the
so-called industrial revolution '-analogous to the feudal system-the cor-
porate system of economic government. "Very much more than half of
industry" in this country, the authors say, is controlled, directly and indirectly,
by 200 corporations which are in turn controlled by "approximately 2,000 in-
dividuals out of a population of one hundred and twenty-five million." 2 Those
few men do not rely for their control on ownership of or investment in a major
portion of the shares of stock of those few corporations; many of them exercise
control with little or no stock or other investment. The owners of the major
portion of the shares in these enterprises are almost completely divorced from
the power to influence their management. We thought that we had established
corporate democracy, but it has vanished or is vanishing. As a consequence
of this more or less unobserved shift of power, a tiny fraction of the population,
we are told, may before long impose their wills on the corporate entities which
dominate the lives of the rest of us who are investors, consumers (customers)
and employees. The authors state that this new economic system is not yet
complete but is already vastly powerful and that there are indications that It
2. Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial, January 1933 Bulletin,
New Haven County Bar Association, pp. 32-40.
'-A review of this book by Nathan Isaacs appeared in 42 YALE L. J. 403. The
reviews in this issue by Jerome Frank, Research Associate at the Yale Law
School, and Norman L. Meyers of Washington, D. C., complete the series.
1. "A revolution which continued for 150 years and had been in preparation
for at least another 150 years may well seem to need a new label," writes
Heaton. It was "the outcome of developments which had been under way since
at least 1600." See 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCS 5. The word "revo-
lution" as applied to such changes is more dramatic than accurate.
2. The authors discuss the concentration of industrial as distinguished from
non-industrial (banking and agricultural) wealth.
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4will not be long (perhaps thirty or forty years) before the process will complete
itself.
It may perhaps be said that the book contains minor errors of description;
that, for instance, it overstates the precise extent of the amount of wealth which
is now directly and indirectly controlled by 200 corporations. This criticism is
probably unwarranted, for the authors are wisely cautious in their statements;
more than that, the criticism is unimportant, if the essential truth of the ex-
position is correct.
When, several weeks ago, the reviewer ventured to express enthusiasm about
the book, one critic replied that its basic notion was not new. But, to paraphrase
Scripture, the same can be said of almost anything human. The Berle and Means
book has, indeed, a rich background; but that is no sin of scholarship. The great
virtue of this volume is its sharp focus and its telling assemblage of detailed
evidence. (It is worth noting that Adam Smith had his forerunners-such as
Hume, Mandeville and the physiocrats.)
What is more important is that the picture in this book of the drift of events
may soon conceivably be of interest only to the antiquarian. For the present
economic crisis may so drastically and rapidly reverse the trend, or retard it,
or hasten the processes of change, that we may shortly find ourselves in a sub-
stantially different economic epoch. In 1902 Ghent predicted that in a com-
paratively short time there would be developed in this country "a benevolent
feudalism"; his neo-feudal barons resemble the "dictators of industry" and
business "princes" described by Berle and Means. Ghent's predictions were not
(in substance as distinguished from form 3) markedly unlike those tentatively
made by Messrs. Berle and Means. But in the thirty-one years that have elapsed
since Ghent wrote, a variety of circumstances prevented the rapid actualization
3. The critic referred to the following: Woodrow Wilson in an address in
1910 described the potentialities of the corporate form of business and tle
unsatisfactory position of the stockholder as compared with thd seemingly
illimitable power of those in control; he referred to the large modern
corporation as an "economic state" or a "body economic" which might "dominate
bodies politic", labelled those in control of these corporations "these kings and
chiefs of industry" and the corporations as their "kingdoms", noted that "some
corporations are in fact controlled from the outside, not from the inside", and
commented, "I think you must admit . . . that the position of the minority
stockholder is, in most of our states, extremely unsatisfactory. I do not wonder
that he sometimes doubts whether corporate stocks are property (it all or not,
He does not seem to enjoy any of the substantial rights of property in connectionl
'with them. He is merely contributing money for the conduct of a businesvs
which other men run as they please. If he does not approve of what they
do, there seems nothing for it but to sell the stock (though their acts may have
depreciated its value immensely)." See Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community
(1910) 35 A. B. A. Rm. 419.
Veblen, in 1923, wrote that, "Business enterprise may be said to have reached
its majority when the corporations came to take the first place and became the
master institution of civilized life"; see ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP 86. Steffens,
(II AUTOBIOGRAPHY, 868-9) in 1932 spoke of "an inevitable conflict between
ownership and management" and said that "financial sovereignty, and therefore
business, and therefore political sovereignty in the United States, may be
passing from the banks to the management of industry-the management, not
the ownership. Indeed it looks as if the fundamental issue may be between
management and ownership."
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of his prediction. And in the present period of uncertainty it would be a rash
man who would venture to foretell what the future has in store.4
It is for that reason that this review began with the statement that, "This
book will perhaps rank with Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations." Adam Smith
was lucky enough to have guessed the general outline of the trends of his time.
If no important changes take place in present trends, then the Modern Corporation
and Private Property may occupy equal rank with Smith's book. But who can
tell? The wise historian knows that history is full of the unexpected.
But if it be assumed that this new corporate epoch will develop and flourish,0
then we will be confronted with a new set of rulers. And Berle and Means
picture them as princes who (as matters now stand judicially) are sovereigns
subject to no effective legal checks.
Some who read Berle's earlier articles in the law reviews with reference to
the changing law of corporations, had a feeling that he was over-sanguine in
his expectation that the courts would soon adopt his views and that, if they did,
it would make much practical difference. Berle has in this book completely and
satisfactorily answered the latter part of that criticism, for there he has pretty
plainly indicated that, whatever new theories the courts may adopt or develop,
the ordinary stockholder is in a rather hopeless condition. For reasons ex-
plained by the authors, the theoretical protection available to the stockholder
through a minority stockholder's suit is seldom useful to him in any practical
sense. While there is (or is in the making) a body of legal theory on the basis
of which courts might, to some extent, curb these new masters, the authors
assert that "the indefiniteness of its application, and the extreme expense and
difficulty of its application, still leave the stockholder virtually helpless. In
fact, if not in law, at the moment we are thrown back on the obvious conclusion
that a stockholder's right lies in the expectation of fair dealing rather than in
the ability to enforce a series of supposed legal claims." 0
4. In the Preface, Berle says, "Is this organization permanent? Will it
intensify or will it break up? Mr. Brandeis struggled to turn the clock back-
ward in 1915; Professor Frankfurter is inclined to believe even now that it
cannot last. To us there is much to indicate that the process will go a great
deal further than it has now gone."
But Brandeis is too able a thinker to adhere blindly and dogmatically today
to 1915 attitudes; see his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U. S. 262, 280 (1932). The reviewer is unaware of the time and place
when Frankfurter expressed the sentiments attributed to him. But Frank-
furter is one of the soundest and most brilliant minds of our time, peculiarly
gifted in his discernment of social trends, and the reviewer strongly inclines
to believe that, if he ever entertained such an attitude, he no longer does so.
5. The recent crisis has already, in some respects, underscored the divorce
of stock-ownership from corporate control. Those in control of many cor-
porations have voluntarily or perforce denuded themselves of their investment
in those enterprises, yet their control continues unabated.
Sales of "control," resulting from deflation, have also hastened the process
of integration. See what has happened, for instance, to the control of many
investment trusts which, in turn, often hold the keys to control of large in-
dustrials and public utilities.
6. If the corporateness described by Berle and Means continues to exist or
grow, then certain aspects of the minority stockholder's suit, not discussed by
the authors, will deserve elaborate attention. Some of those aspects may be
briefly indicated as follows:
1933]
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Considerable attention should also be given to the fact (but briefly adverted
to by Berle and Means 7 because their study was primarily of the stockholder's
position) that, more and more, the position of the bondholder and of the stock-
holder of large corporations are merging. It is true that the stockholder has
no right to fixed income while the holder of an ordinary corporate bond seems
to have a right to fixed income and to ultimate payment of a definite amount of
principal. But the processes of reorganization can deprive the bondholder of
those rights. If an ordinary corporate bond were realistically worded, it would
perhaps advise the bondholder that the corporation was agreeing either (1)
to pay him a stated sum of money with interest at stated periods, or (2) if the
corporation finds itself financially embarrassed, then, at the option of those in
control,s to give him new securities which might take the form of non-voting
stock in a new corporation.9 And.in so far as a bondholder has an income bond 10
Lawyers representing large corporations are inclined to ascribe improper
motives to all those who bring such suits; such a sweeping indictment is un-
justified. It is, however, true that a considerable proportion of those suits are
brought by so-called "strikers" who buy a few shares solely for the purpose of
instituting such actions. If their suits succeed, the courts reward them hand-
somely by making generous allowances for fees and expenses. This raises the
question of the social value of the minority stockholder's suit. On the one hand
it may be argued that whatever the purpose of such strikers, there is something
to be said in their behalf since, occasionally, they do valiant work on behalf of
their fellow stockholders, and the generous allowances which they receive from
the courts may perhaps be justified on the analogy of the damages allotted in
qui tam actions; perhaps someone will some day write a treatise called In
Praise of Venner, et al.
On the other hand, many of such stockholder's suits brought by strikers are
disposed of by settlement without trial; such a result does nothing for the
body of the stockholders. Not infrequently the striker obtains a settlement
from an innocent management-on the same basis that a reputable and innocent
man will often settle an unfounded blackmailing suit for breach of promise. It
is arguable that, since the minority stockholder's action is seldom practically
useful to the honest investor and is principally serviceable to the parasitic
striker, it has little social value and should be abolished by statutes which would,
as substitutes, develop or create governmental agencies to investigate corporate
practices and protect the investor. Such a suggestion, however, raises the
question whether such political agencies would be sufficiently efficient and active
to constitute adequate substitutes for the minority stockholder's suit. Pro-
phylactic devices, private and governmental, also deserve consideration.
7. Pp. 279-280.
8. Sometimes, in those circumstances, there is a shift of control.
9. Or even perhaps in the same company. Cf. Phipps v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Ry Co., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). Under the new
Federal railroad reorganization statute, the point made in the text may become
increasingly obvious.
10. The present economic crisis may conceivably lead to a period in which
financing will be done through the use of income bonds or stock,-that is, in such
a way as to prevent the injury to the investor which results from the fact
that the individual investor is one of a group whose securities call for the
payment of fixed charges which, when they cannot be met in a period of crisis,
precipitate the waste and disorganization resulting from receivership.
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the principal of which is payable at a long distant date, he is in substantially
the same position as a non-voting stockholder.'"
If as these authors intimate the consumers and the employees 'are or oon
will be in much the same helpless condition as the stockholder, then, our
destinies may in a few decades or sooner be in the hands of a small group of
unregulated business potentates. But there is this defect in Berle and Mleans'
book: it strongly implies that these potentates are an integrated group. Today
a highly-conscious unified oligarchy of American business rulers popularly
referred to as "Wall Street" does not-for better or for worse--exist outside
the wishful imagination of certain radicals. Psychologiczlly, and therefore
pragmatically, there is today no considerable proletariat class in this country; 12
!1. When a large corporation becomes financially embarrassed and reor-
ganization ensues, the old control may be changed. But the individual bond-
holders do not usually determine the successor control. Not infrequently that
is determined by the banking houses which sold the bonds to the investing
public; those houses often create the reorganization committee which determines
to whom control shall pass. Cf. Frank, Reflections on Some Realistic Aspects
of Corporate Reorganization, soon to be published in the VA. L. Rsv.
It remains to be seen what will be the effect on this situation if the courts
adopt and develop the doctrine of Bergelt v. Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 837, 253
N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1932), af'd, 236 App. Div. 777 (1st. Dep't 1932),
which, under certain circumstances, permits minority bondholders to procure,
from the issuing banking house, a list of the names and addresses of persons
holding bonds.
The new Federal railroad reorganization statute provides that such lists must
be filed in court.
12. Whether widespread unemployment, if too long continued, will change
this status is anybody's guess. Two recent books stress the fact that in
America there is as yet no large self-conscious proleteriat class; see W LLIMmS,
Huss ASPECTS OF UNEMPLOY~MET Am RE=n (1933), and CALvEno;,
Tn LIBERATION oF A m icAN LrrERATURm (1932); the latter book is peculiarly
interesting in this respect because the author is an avowed Marxian.
Marx's prediction of an unavoidable clash between self-conscious classes was
based upon a survey of the European scene. But in Europe the division of
society into sharp and defined classes had existed under feudalism, and con-
sequently class groupings with class attitudes were a reality; the stratification
in the form of a more or less conscious ruling group and a more or less conscious
governed group was taken over in capitalist-industrialist Europe from the
preceding feudal epoch. In this country there was no period in which anything
like a developed feudal structure existed and therefore this stratification did
not occur in anything like the same manner. In the United States the aristo-
cracy, if any, has been based primarily upon wealth which according to Sapir,
"means a psycliological . . . levelling because of the feeling that wealth is
an accidental or accorded quality of an individual as contrasted with blood."
Entrance into or emergence from the aristocracy seems to many persons to be
largely due to chance; and this and a variety of other causes has created a
"psychological levelling" which is hostile to class consciousness.
Of course the American frontier helped to foster this psychological levelling.
"For three centuries," it has been said, "the common American had an easier
opportunity to become a free economic agent than did any of his contemporaries."
The workaday backwoods equalitarian mood of the frontier, we are told,
permeated all American thinking. It still vitally affects American attitudes,
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most of the unemployed look upon themselves as capitalists momentarily without
capital. And the American business bosses, in like manner, have not class-
consciously worked together or "exercised their full powers; nor are they even
aware of- their potential strength. There is more jealousy and less cooperation
between these modern sovereigns than between national states; the business
rulers have not even developed as much of an organization as the League
of Nations. It may be that the intensity of our present economic miseries is,
in part, the consequence of this lack of cohesion. (One recalls John Maynard
Keynes' comment: "A Banker's Conspiracy! The idea is absurd. I only
wish there were one!")
The American business potentate, believing as he does in the democratic
dogma 13 experiences a strong psychological deterrent to looking upon himself
as a ruler and to working out logically the implications of his economic position.
That is perhaps one reason why Ghent's 1902 prophecies and the more tentative
1932 predictions of Berle and Means may not come true-at any rate for a
period the duration of which is unpredictable.
although the frontier disappeared several decades ago. That fact should give
pause to those geographic determinists who glibly explain the American credo
as solely or primarily a frontier product. Just as that body of attitudes persists
when the frontier is non-existent, so the mere fact of a frontier, although
doubtless an important causal factor, cannot alone account for its original
existence. Other countries have had frontiers. Think of Russia today; its
immense frontier is not producing anything remotely resembling American
"individualism."
The peculiar American culture is a complicated composite; religious, sci-
entific, industrial and economic factors have inter-acted with a variety of other
factors. Ideas, good and bad, often become imbedded in a culture and have
their effects long after the causes which produced those, ideas have vanished.
As Fouillde said, every idea is a potential force. Thus Jeffersonianism was
originally a hodge-podge, an emotional and intellectual mince-pie, containing
among other things, some French idealistic equalitarianism, some English
political individualism, some indigenous agrarianism. Although most of its
original ingredients have evaporated, it is still an active psychological levelling
force in American life.
13. Bryce noted in 1894 that, "In America there are two classes only, those
who have succeeded and those who have failed . . . In America men hold
others at bottom to be exactly the same as themselves. If a man is enormously
rich . . . he is an object of interest, perhaps of admiration, possibly even of
reverence. But he is deemed to be still of the same flesh and blood as other
men . . . In France and Switzerland there lingers a kind of feeling as if the
old noblesse were not quite like other men. The Swiss peasant, with all his
manly independence, has in many cantons a touch of reverence for the old
families. . . . Nothing like this is possible in America."
In 1932 another foreign observer, Bonn (Tim CRISIS OF CAPITALISM IX
AmEnICA) wrote, "As most of the industrial leaders are sprung from the same
ranks of life as the rest of the American people, they are animated by the came
sentiments as their former neighbors." There is a "notion that everyone who
is still a nobody has the opportunity of becoming a somebody." "Simple folk"
feel that the successful capitalist "is one of themselves--bigger, more successful,




It is not impossible that current disorganization will soon push us in the
direction of benevolent feudalism. But if the present situation is to be compared
with the "feudal system," then it should be compared with the earlier stages
of that system when baronial anarchy was regnant. Perhaps the businezs
barons will become as clearly cognizant of their potentialities as were the
feudal barons. Perhaps a dominant business prince, guided by a new Machiavelli,
will subjugate the warring barons as the kings subjugated the feudal barons. Or
luck or intelligence may pull us out of the current depression in some way that will
prevent such cohesion.
Or we may, via the Reconstruction Finance Corporation or some similar political
device, find our way into state capitalism. In that event, economic centraliza-
tion may occur in strictly political form. And who knows whether it will then
go further or recede?
Berle and Means suggest that the corporation under its new masters may
challenge and perhaps dominate the political state to a far greater e-tent than
has occurred heretofore. But the recuperative power of the political state is
immense, and prediction in this respect is dangerous. In all likelihood, it will
be urged that efforts should be made to restore what might be called the anarchy
of old-fashioned competition.14 Whether that would be desirable may be
questionable.15  Whether it is possible or probable is also a question; the very
belief that it is impossible-which this book encourages-if that belief becomes
sufficiently widespread, zay mnake it impossible. A possibility more likely of
at least temporary realization is that of a program which will allow and even
foster the consolidation of private corporate control, at the same time subjecting
it to strict political regulation.16
If centralization does not take political form, and if the power of the giant
corporations persists, and if a tiny minority continue in control of those corpora-
tions, these further problems will arise:
1. Is it socially desirable to re-democratize that control? If so, how can
that end be attained? The insiders successfully reelect themselves at corporate
elections through the control of (1) the proxy machinery 17 or (2) a small
amount of voting stock with the majority disfranchised because the majority
holds non-voting stock or (3) voting trusts. The courts seem to furnish few
weapons for a fight for re-enfranchisement. Can legislation do the trick?
2. If much of real government is exercised by the large corporations, and if
democratization of this economic government is desirable, should it stop with
stockholders? Should it be extended to (a) creditors, (b) employees,' 8 (c) con-
sumers?
3. If democratization does not develop, what will be the devolution of the
narrowly-held ruling power? Will it become hereditary? Or will election to
participation in the controlling group resemble election to an Academy or a
14. Cf. Slichter, The Organization and Control of Economic Activity, in
TuGwELL, THE TREND OF EcoN0mics (1930); STUART CHASE, Tim NEW DEAL
(1932).
15. See CHAmBERLAiN, FAREWELL TO REFORMT (1932).
16. See Brandeis' dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U. S. 262, 280 (1932).
17. So far as the reviewer knows, Berl and Means for the first time ade-
quately discuss the use of proxy machinery for perpetuation of corporate control.
18. See the early writings of C. D. H. Cole.
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college faculty? 19 Can and should the principle of the inheritance tax be
applied to the transfer of such power?
4. And what self-limitations will these rulers impose oA their power? How
far will such restraints result from the necessity, which (as Hume pointed out)
even a tyrant is under, of a minimum placating of the governed? Will they
develop a feeling of wide social responsibility--either out of self-respect 20 or
from other motives? 21 Since they will have little or no investment in the
corporations which they control, their incentives will not derive from a desire
for profits. They may conceivably develop ambitions (resembling those of such
a benevolent despot as Joseph II) to do conscientiously what they conceive to
be the best possible for all those whom they rule-the investors, the customers
and the employees.
5. What will develop in the way of integrating their control with the control
of credit?
6. What will be the relation of these business rulers to our political govern-
ments (local, state and national) in the United States? 22
7. How far will their interests compel the development of internationalism
or cosmopolitanism either through or as supplemental -to, or in disregard of,
political states? 23 Will these narrowly controlled giant corporations, through
cosmopolitan cartels and other devices, spread their power over the globe and
create a new world-order?
These and many other questions buzz in the mind of the reader of this
important book.
19. This problem will soon come to the fore in communist Russia and fascist
Italy. In this connection note that Bertrand Russell, Lincoln Steffens, the Webbs,
and now Messrs. Berle and Means suggest resemblances between the Bolshevik
commissars and American business rulers. Thus Bertrand Russell in the pro-
face to THE PROSPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION (1023) speaks of "the
extreme similarity between the Bolshevik Commissar and the American trust
magnate."
20. Cf. STUART CHASE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 169-171.
21. See Paul Douglas, The Reality of Non-Commercial Incentives in Economic
Life, in TUGwELL, TREND OF ECONOMICS (1924) and Berle and Means, pp. 122,
350.
Our business potentates have perhaps been less happy than is ordinarily
supposed. Dewey commented that "even those who seem to be in control, and
to carry the expression of their individual abilities to a high pitch, are sub-
merged. They may be captains of finance and industry, but until there is
some consensus of opinion as to the meaning of finance and industry In
civilization as a whole, they cannot be captains of their own souls-their beliefs
and aims. They exercise leadership surreptitiously and, as it were, absent-
mindedly. . . . If there is in. general any degree of contentment on the part
of those who form our pecuniary oligarchy, the evidence is sadly lacking. As
for many, they are impelled hither and yon by forces beyond their control";
INDrviDUAmIsM, OLD AND NEw (1930) 53-54.
22. Of. LINCOLN STEENS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1931), especially Vol. I.
23. Cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, PROSPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION (1923);
LASKI, STUDIES IN LAW AND POLITICs (1932) 237 et seq.
[Vol. 42
Reviewed by Normn L. Mcycrs
IF Technocracy did nothing else in its short life, it dramatized the persistent
recurrence and vitality of the social and economic analyses of Thorstein Veblen.
Twelve years ago Veblen pointed out the dominant factor of a developing
technology in modern life; 1 and even the somewhat hasty exploitation of that
analysis applied to the current depression seemingly does not prevent its
constant recurrence in sounder economic discussion. And it is not mere coin-
cidence that at this time in The Modern Corporation and Private Property his
theory of Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Modern Times (1923)
is elaborated by a statistical but scholarly, and nevertheless practical, study of
the two hundred largest non-banking corporations in the United States.
In the short time since the book has been published, it has already received
generous and deserving, if at times uncritical, praise for what it does. It
demonstrates in detail, and as a matter of cold fact, Veblen's theories con-
cerning the separation and degradation of the investors' stake in an enterprise,
historically dubbed "ownership", from the "control" of the business enterprise;
and presents a lucid analysis of the legal devices whereby "control" has been
shifted to minority groups or to the "management". The first half of the title
of this book amply deals with the first half of the title of Veblen's; the book
proves concretely what has been obvious for a decade to the hitherto submerged
economists familiar with Veblen. In a recent dissenting opinion 2 M1r. Justice
Stone has begun the process of creating a majority recognition of the legal
significance of this part of the book. However, regarding "Private Property" in
the large scale "Business Enterprise" there are many generalizations in the
book which challenge attention, in the light either of Veblen's analysis or of
the experience of the past few years.
Based on cautious statistics, the authors present sundry bold generalizations.
"Within (the corporate system) there exists a centripetal attraction which
draws wealth together into aggregations of constantly increasing size, at the
same time throwing control into the hands of fewer and fewer men. The
trend is apparent; and no limit is as yet in sight". Comments are hazarded
concerning the time it will take until all property is controlled by giant
corporations; and until there shall be super-giant corporations the size of the
combined two hundred under observation. Although the Artificial Perzon has
taken the place of the Captain of Industry, the prediction is strongly reminiscent
of the sanguine but comparatively inept Marxian prophecy of the concentrate
of wealth into a few hands before Dcr Tag.
However, this analysis of Big Business is made as of January 1, 1930.
While apparently the choice of that date was fortuitous, it is rapidly becoming
apparent that the selection of that date was a happichance, since the fall of
1. VEBLEN, THE ENGINEEnS AND THE PaICE SYSTEM (1921).
2. "Extension of corporate activities, distribution of corporate personnel,
stockholders and directors through many states, and the diffusion of corporate
ownership, separated from corporate management, make the integrity of the
conduct of large business corporations increasingly a matter of national rather
than local concern [citing this book] to which the federal courts should be
quick to respond when their jurisdiction is rightly invoked." Rogers v. Guaranty
Trust Co., Oct. term, 1932, decision handed down on Jan. 23, 1933 (involving




1929 seemingly marks the end of another business epoch. The rapid growth
of the two hundred corporations along with others in the Coolidge boom was
produced by stock jobbing on a colossal scale; merger, new security issue, and
reinvestment of questionable earnings produced gigantic balance sheets, por-
tending stability, diversification, economy, strength and other stock market
desiderata. But a cursory scanning of the list of the two hundred giant
corporations shows that at least eighteen of them are already actually in
receivership; how many more belong there only the gods and the R. F. C. can
tell.
The explanation of the weakness of these giant corporations-and others
not so gigantic-must include consideration of the nature of business enterprise,
Veblen's dichotomy of business and industry,3 of the pecuniary institution and
the industrial appliance should not have been overlooked when predictions of
the future were made. After the zoom of the recent stock jobbing to enlarge
the pecuniary institution, we are now made sadly aware of the resulting prob-
lems of industrial management, of the mastering of irrepressible new tech-
nological advances, of the domestication of the exuberant and troublesome
machine. Events since January 1, 1930 indicate the existence of centrifugal
as well as centripetal forces affecting the aggregations of wealth.
The two hundred corporations include five moving picture companies: these
companies are recognizing that chain theatres are not chain stores and must
be managed with the hauteur demanded by palaces of corresponding elegance,
and overhead; and that the production of pictures is not adapted to the con-
veyor-belt process. As a result there are indications that these giant cor-
porations may jettison large theatre holdings on the one hand, and farm out
production to independent units on the other. Finance may very well return
the business to Showmen. The list includes forty-four public utility companies.
Recent regulatory commission success in the struggle to stop the "milking"
of operating companies through intercorporate fees strikes at the jugular of
the present utility holding companies. And the recent depression experience
of easily-financed operating companies carrying the holding companies may
do away with the justification for existence of many of this group. On the
other hand there are some forty-two railroads in the list; and under the
consolidation proposals of the I. C. C. and of the recent Coolidge Committee, 4
the number may decrease and the size of the giant railroad corporations
increase in accordance with the predicted trend. There are some twenty
petroleum companies, and technological conditions favor further consolidation;
in fact since January 1, 1930 three of the listed companies have become one.
On the other hand, impending pipe line regulation may compel some realignment
in that industry. The last decade saw undue emphasis on the balance sheet
and corporate bigness; the next may see a searching for an optimum size for
a corporation, dictated by technological considerations and the limits of
managerial ability. The corporate dinosaur may yet give way to the whippet.
-The authors define "control" as the power to elect the majority of a board of
directors. But what actual control does a board of directors exercise in a
modern corporation? It would be a matter of super-human intelligence and
ability for the small number of men who served as interlocking directorates
of these two hundred corporations to control them according to the traditional
3. VEBLEN, THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904).
4. Cf. MOULTON AND AssocIATEs, THE AmErtIcA TRANSPORTATION PROBLEb
(prepared for the National Transportation Committee) (1933).
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theory of the functions of directorship. At best they now juggle with balance
sheets and financial reports; technological problems, labor policy, and In-
dustrial detail are given but summary concern. The recent revelations in the
more pathological cases-the Krueger and Toll kingdom, the Insull empire,
the Bank of United State bailiwick,5 and the less notorious principalities such
as the Gillette merger-give ample evidence of the lack of full control, even
knowledge, by directors; not as a matter of legal theory perhaps, but certainly
as an actuality. The same and other cases of common report likewise absolve
"management" from full control, and even knowledge. A literal acceptance of
the authors' concept of control would compel the conclusion that The Modern
Corporation was anarchic, even before 1929.
Banking institutions have been excluded from this study for good and obvious
reasons. But a casual reading of Veblen or an eye on the passing scene, even
that of 1929, would have gained recognition for the part the larger use of
credit plays in The Modern Corporation. A tardy revival in interest in the
Pujo Committee findings and in Brandeis' Other People's Mon yc indicates that
the authors were not alone lulled by the glow of the era of Banking States-
manship. However it would seem that the rigor of the logic of their thesis
would compel a further isolation of "control" by tracing the dictates of the
credit institutions on to the boards of directors. Even a "minority" on a board
of directors may "control". Senator Norris' recent attack indicated the in-
tricacy of the mesh of directors of banking institutions and the directorates
of these large corporations. The demand for consideration of the part the
banks play in the "control" of corporations, along with the "minority control"
and the "management", is not unwarranted.
For that matter, the influence of even the impotent organizations of labor
can not be ignored in considering the "control" of The Modern Corporation.
Above all, an analysis of "control" must recognize the concomitant power of
organized society with that of the boards of directors. The "control" of
commissions over rates, security issue, financial and labor policy, etc. of the
utilities and railroads in the list of two hundred corporations is patent. The
emergent national policy over raw material industry will greatly affect a large
number on the list. Legislation recently adopted or proposed Will seriously
affect the size and character of the chains and other business included on the
list. The State has not yet surrendered supremacy to the Corporation.
The problem of control in the Modern Corporation is not dissimilar from the
problem of sovereignty in the Modern State. There is no unity; a pluralistic
analysis seems-the most promising. The separation of possession from owner-
ship in large scale industry, by altering the psychological or spiritual rewards
to the craftsman challenges the traditional basis of private property; 0 owner-
ship has become absentee; the "leisure" of investors has accentuated social
problems. 7  The concentration of wealth deeply affects the workaday of the
common man,s technological advances attack the price system and threaten to
raise the Engineer to a position of power equal to that of the financial status
5. Inasmuch as the Senate Committee has not yet investigated other large
banks it would be unfair to do more than drop this footnote concerning the
activities in mergers, etc. of the President of the National City Bank.
6. Cf. VEBLEN, INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE STATE OF THE INDUSTIAL
ARs (1914).
7. Cf. VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LEIsuRE CLASS (1899).
8. Cf. VEBLEN, THE VESTED INTEESTS AND THE CO.iM.ON MDLN (1919).
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of the directors of credit or the politico-social status of the State. 9 Science
has become a matter of major business concern.10 In the words of the authors
of this book, slightly amended, "The institution here envisaged calls for
analysis not in terms of business enterprise [alone] but in terms of social
organization." Absenteeism plays a large part in the demolition of "Private
Property" but it is not the sole governing factor over the size and function of
The Modern Corporation.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF DEBTORS' ESTATES. B3y
Wesley A. Sturges. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1933. pp. xiv,1141. $6.50.
IN this volume the author states as his purpose: (1) to present a general
outline of the typical methods of liquidation, namely, compositions, assignments
for the benefit of creditors, receiverships and bankruptcy; (2) to present each
method as a separate technique; (3) to suggest the combination of two or more
of these methods; (4) to consider the use of receiverships to supplement or to
displace compositions and assignments and the supremacy of bankruptcy over
other methods of liquidation.
The Reviewer is in entire sympathy with the idea of dealing with the ad-
ministration of insolvent debtors' estates, as a whole. The division of law
school curricula into courses is not entirely scientific, and most law schools are
attempting by experiments of one sort or another, to make a more satisfactory
division of the law. To this end subjects that in the past have been treated
separately are sometimes united by groupings made either according to as-
sociations of basic fact or function, or according to associations of legal ideas.
Sometimes it is possible to combine both kinds of association. Where it is not,
the reviewer believes it is better to adhere to the latter method. For in the
study of business or economics fact or function might properly predominate;
but three years is a short time in which to crowd a study of law in its technical
aspect, and this reviewer at least looks with jealousy at any attempt to include
at the expense of technical legal study, matter which though appropriate in
itself, is in its nature economic rather than legal.
In the administration of debtors' estates by the various methods dealt with in
this case book, there are, however, not only associations of function, but basic
legal conceptions which form connecting links. The chief of these are preferences
and fraudulent conveyances. It is a common desire of insolvent debtors to
prefer some creditors to others; it is by no means uncommon for them also to
attempt by some device either to retain part or all their property so that it
cannot be reached by their creditors, or to make a gift of it to relatives or
friends. The debtor may seek to accomplish these objects either by dealings
with an individual creditor or friend, or by composition or assignment. Al-
though preferences were not unlawful at Common law, so far as fraudu-
lent conveyances are concerned, the Statute of Elizabeth and the modern
law developed from it, furnish some remedy to individual creditors. Statutes
regulating voluntary general assignments, Receiverships and Bankruptcy have
furnished more complete protection against fraudulent conveyances, and the
9. Cf. VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEN1 (1921).
10. Cf. VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION (1910).
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only effectual protection against preferences. It would seem perhaps the most
logical as well as satisfactory beginning to the whole subject with which,
this case book deals to print some decisions illustrating the common law in
regard to preferences and fraudulent conveyances. Every teacher, however, has
his own ways of developing his subject, and arranges his materials accordingly,
and it would be absurd to suggest that there is only one good way. The cases
that are contained in the book are well selected and well edited. If a criticism
is to be made of them, it would be that in the earnest desire to include the
latest decisions historical development is not much considered. It must always
be true that judgment concerning future growth will best be cultivated by a
study of past growth. There are frequent pertinent notes in the book and not
infrequent suggestive inquiries. Occasionally merely the facts of a case are
given and the student is asked to supply the proper decision.
In comparison with the matter devoted to other topics, the space allotted
to Acts of Bankruptcy seems somewhat small. Especially it seems that fraudu-
lent conveyances both as Acts of Bankruptcy and as affording ground for
recovery of property, might have received fuller treatment. The Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act which has been enacted in a number of states
would certainly seem of sufficient pertinence and interest to justify the in-
clusion of some material illustrating its effect.
The editor includes besides cases and statutes statistical summaries, reports
of investigations and of public hearings, recommendations of bar associations,
and other matter. For reasons stated above, this reviewer does not think it
the most profitable use that can be made of a student's time to discuss in
class whether bankruptcy procedure is too expensive in the larger cities or
whether trustees' compensation is sufficient, or similar matters. But a teacher
who does not wish to spend time discussing this material with his students is
at liberty to omit it. And as the author explains, this functional material may
be extremely useful to the student outside the class room not only for its
informative value with respect to the topics referred to, but also to provoke
interest in current problems of administration of the law in this general field.
Harvard Law School. SAUEL WnaSr0N.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN DIVORCE. By Alfred Cahen. New
York: Columbia University Press. 1932. pp. 149. $2.25.
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS. By Chester G. Vernier. Volume H. Stanford
University: Stanford University Press. 1932. pp. xxvii, 523. -5.
THOUGH the increasing importance of divorce has made it the most dramatic
phenomenon in the field of domestic relations, a formulation of its problems
will vary as it is presented by the lawyer, the sociologist, the legislator or the
cleric. So, to some, the unhealthy survival of the vestiges of canon law is the
most important cause for the abuses and scandals of our present law. A more
popular study may treat the sexological factors of family life in a pseudo-
scientific manner.
Nothing quite so startling is attempted in either of the books under review.
Doctor Cahen is the sociologist; Professor Vernier, the legal scholar.
Doctor Cahen has compressed a tremendous amount of labor within less than
150 pages. By means of charts, graphs and maps he has made clear and
focused attention upon the many problems relating to divorce, its underlying
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causes and the gradual breakdown of the home which we are witnessing. His
method of research is interestingly set forth, and his diagnosis of prevailing
conditions and trends are well worth the attention not only of the social worker,
but of the legislator, the lawyer, and the jurist as well.
While it is true, as the author points out, that the study of this question is
not wholly to be found in divorce statistics, and that the human element in-
volved in many divorce cases is so difficult of ascertainment, yet unless the facts
as presented by Dr. Cahen are dramatized for the benefit of those interested in
the problem, but little progress can be made in attempting to solve its many
manifestations.
Professor Vernier's exhaustive treatise is the first important comparative
survey of the divorce and separation laws of the 48 states, Alaska, the District
of Columbia and Hawaii since Stimson's American Statute Law was published
in 1886.
It is virtually an annotated digest, containing the arguments, pro and con,
on the many debatable questions arising in this field, buttressed by a resum6
of all of the state statutes, adjudicated cases, law journal articles and anno-
tations in lists of published cases.
It also contains a brief summary of the common law on many of the questions
involved. The comment and criticism of the author with respect to the vagaries
of the different state legislatures and the puncturing of many ideas held by the
public is interestingly set forth.
These two books are valuable as well as interesting additions to the steadily
increasing literature on family laws.
Court of Domestic Relations, Chicago, Ill. JosPIX SABAT9.
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